This 11.. Erik Lidman is a professor of corporate law at Stockholm University and director of the Swedish Corporate Governance Institute (SCGI). Jesper Zackrisson is a doctoral candidate in civil law affiliated with SCGI and is writing his dissertation on the definition of inside information under Article 7 of the MAR. It should also be noted that Zackrisson’s dissertation addresses current issues that have arisen in connection with the judgements in the cases, and that some of the text and material in this article has been drawn from the as-yet-unpublished dissertation. The authors have also co-authored two commentaries, one for each of the cases discussed here, together with Jesper Lau Hansen. Several of the arguments presented there are also discussed here. See Hansen, Lidman & Zackrisson (2026), The new CJEU MAR case C-363/24, Carnegie v. Finansinspektionen: a comment, Oxford Business Law Blog, https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/oblb/blog-post/2026/04/new-cjeu-mar-case-c-36324-carnegie-v-finansinspektionen-comment; Hansen, Lidman & Zackrisson (2026), Comment on C-229-24, Brännelius, Oxford Business Law Blog, https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/oblb/blog-post/2026/04/comment-c-229-24-brannelius.article comments on two judgements delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in early 2026 – Carnegie v. Finansinspektionen (Case C-363/24) and Brännelius (Case C-229/24) – each concerning the interpretation of Articles 7 and 17 of MAR and each arising from Swedish proceedings referred to the Court. In Carnegie, the question was whether a communication that a person has been placed on an issuer’s insider list and prohibited from selling shares can be “specific enough” to constitute inside information under Article 7(1)(a) and 7(2) of MAR, even where the reasons for the inclusion are unclear. We argue that the Court’s conclusion is unsurprising and consistent with established case law: the bare fact of an insider-list addition is ordinarily “neutral”, and specificity requires something further indicating a potential price effect. We particularly welcome the Court’s joint assessment of the “precise nature” and “significant price effect” criteria, which departs from the separation maintained in Geltl and aligns with a position we have defended elsewhere. Brännelius concerns the relationship between Articles 7 and 17 – specifically, whether information can be regarded as “made public” under Article 7(1)(a) only where disclosure has taken place in the manner prescribed by Article 17 and the Implementing Regulation. Read literally, the Court’s answer is affirmative and, we argue, highly surprising, as it runs counter to the prevailing view (the “herrschende Meinung”) reflected in guidance from CESR/ESMA, BaFin and the FCA, and in the Advocate General’s Opinion, that an equivalent degree of dissemination suffices. We contend that a strict, lexical reading is untenable: it would impose a disproportionate disclosure burden on issuers and can hardly have been intended. A teleological reading, by contrast, resolves these difficulties. Because the regulation’s objective is to secure a level playing field in information, information that genuinely reaches the investing public through other effective means should likewise be treated as having been made public.
Introduction
In recent years, the interpretation of Articles 7 and 17 of the EU Market Abuse Regulation 22. Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council. (MAR) has been at the centre of several legal proceedings in Sweden. Two of these proceedings culminated in early 2 ...
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