Greenwashing through the Lens of Agency Theory: A Critical Perspective on the Disclosure Regulation in Scandinavia

Nordisk Tidsskrift for Selskabsret

2026 - nummer 1

Udgivet: 23. april 2026

Sider: 61 - 79 (19 sider)

This paper investigates the extent to which the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) mitigates or exacerbates greenwashing, framed as an agency problem within the investment value chain between Financial Market Participants, Financial Advisors, and End Investors. Employing doctrinal legal methodology, the paper examines both the SFDR’s product categories (Articles 6, 8, and 9) and its substantive legal principles, including sustainability risks, principal adverse impacts, good governance, and Do No Significant Harm. On this basis, it argues de lege ferenda that a more prescriptive legal framework is needed for product categorisation to ensure legal certainty and reduce agency risks, such as moral hazard and adverse selection. In contrast, disclosure obligations relating to the substantive principles show signs of progress to address the information asymmetry, though tensions remain between the aims of sustainable finance and traditional goals of financial regulation, particularly investor protection. The paper concludes by highlighting the need to better align the objective of steering private capital toward responsible investments with the need of providing retail investors with clear, relevant information to maximise their risk-adjusted returns.

1. Introduction

As a cornerstone of the EU Action Plan for Financing Sustainable Growth, 1. the Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (SFDR) was adopted in November 2019 and introduced a number of extensive ...

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